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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Cyberethics
According to Quinn (2006, p. 55) “[e]thics is the philosophical study of morality, a rational examination into
people’s moral beliefs and behavior… The study of ethics is particularly important right now. Our society is
changing rapidly as it incorporates the latest advances in information technology … some people selfishly
exploit new technologies for personal gain…” The notion of cyberethics was born when the prefix cyber was
introduced by novelist William Gibson in his book Neuromancer. The “cyber” refers to the world of
networked computers; it therefore follows that cyberethics is the examination into people’s moral beliefs and
behaviors in an online environment. Tavani (2007, ch. 3) proposes seven different ways of evaluating
cyberethics issues. He also poses the question whether cyberethics issues are unique ethical issues. I.e.,
whether cybertechnology has had “a significant impact on our moral, legal, and social systems.” Other key
sources on the topic include: Halbert (2005), Tavani (2004), Spinello (2003), Reynolds (2003), Kizza (2002),
Spinello and Tavani (2001) and Fodor (1994).

1.2 Globalization
Globalization refers to “the process of creating a worldwide network of businesses and markets.
Globalization results in a greater mobility of goods, services and capital around the world. Investments are
made across national boundaries” (Quinn, 2006, p. 385). Globalization is at the heart of cyberethics in terms
of its reach to a global society that has access to communications infrastructure. Quinn (2006, p. 54) defines a
society as “an association of people organized under a system of rules designed to advance the good of its
members over time.” Yet there are no distinct global rules that govern cyberethics, beyond guidelines, and
this is where the challenges for international law begin. Even when treaties are ratified that pertain to
computer-related issues, they are not truly global in the sense that all countries have agreed, but they are
usually driven by a select group of countries (Johnson and Goetz, 2007, p. 17).

1.3 Policies, Procedures and Practice
Policies and procedures can be considered as formal rules that help resolve ambiguities in the organization
(SANS Institute, 2007c). It is essential that organizations have clearly written policies on information and
computer security issues. Easttom (2006, p. 144) writes that policies should cover acceptable use of
organizational computers, the Internet, email, and other aspects of the system; they should prohibit the
installation of any software on the systems; they should also “clearly delineate who has access to what data,
how backups are performed, and what to do to recover data in the case of a disaster…” Policies differ from
procedures. Procedures are defined as a set of instructions; they set out how things should be done. Policies
are rigid while procedures are more flexible. Procedures are often described as a course of action developed
to implement policy. For example, the anti-virus procedure in an organization typically defines guidelines for
effectively reducing the threat of computer viruses on the organization’s network. A policy is defined as an
organized and established system. They are a commitment by which an organization is held accountable.
Policies should be written down, approved by management, and checked by lawyers (Bakry, 2003, p. 13).

1.4 Information Security Benchmarking
Security benchmarking is evaluating a company’s information technology security against another
organization or set of security principles. The measures of evaluation are both qualitative and quantitative.
Symantec sets out its best practice strategies for government and enterprises, indicating the following:
security policies; risk assessments; standards, procedures and metrics; security roadmaps; selection and
implementation of solutions; training of security professionals and employees; security management; and
incident response and recovery (Australian Crime Commission, 2004, p. 56).

2. ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE AND SECTOR
2.1 Information Security Challenges in Small, Medium and Large Enterprise
In a small organization budgets are often limited (CERT, 2007a). In these firms, information security
requirements are traditionally considered in terms of hardware and software, and as such treated as
overheads. However, this trend is changing as small players find themselves engaged in electronic commerce
with big business through global supply chains. Medium size organizations are more likely to place a greater
emphasis on information security and data protection, especially given the requirement to do business online
but they usually lack the security stealth of large organizations that span numerous countries. These
transnational corporations are increasingly facing the pressures of globalization. How to protect their
intellectual property, how to comply with laws and standards across jurisdictions (e.g. fair trade acts) etc.

2.2 Defining the Perimeters of a Global Organization
Among the hardest objectives to satisfy is managing security beyond the organization. It is often difficult to
define where perimeters stop and start and what should be considered internal and external to the
organization. For instance, consider an employee who forwards their work mail to a personal account on
Google. Perimeter approaches to security are usually adopted by small organizations that have small budgets.
Larger organizations tend to adopt hybrid security methods, where perimeters are secured but there is also a
layered security approach analyzing individual systems within a network (Easttom, 2006, p. 14).

2.3 New Technologies Facilitating New Business Relationships
In global business today, relationships between companies in the form of alliances, partnerships and
business-to-business (B2B) exchanges are playing a crucial role in time-to-market (TTM). Information flow

in the form of documents and transactions between firms is growing exponentially. Electronic transactions,
just like paper-based transactions, are subject to regulations. The diverse range of end-user devices in the
form of laptops, PDAs, and wearables that are powered by wireless networks are creating new challenges for
personnel, as organizations demand real-time information. The software used on these hardware devices also
carries with it security risks. Consider software errors that lead to system malfunctions and outright system
failures. Major problems with electronic business for instance, may arise when one organization is engaged
in best-in-class security practices, and the partner organization may not even be certified. Cultural differences
also abound as organizations attempt to expand their boundaries. Strategic decisions to outsource are made
by executives in positions of power who are often unaware of the implications. A typical scenario can be
found in the government department who opts to outsource government-to-citizen (G2C) transactions to an
offshore enterprise, only to later realize that private information has somehow found itself in the wrong
hands. “While governments set their own standards … the extent of standards use within the private sector is
very patchy between different organizations” (Australian Crime Commission, 2004, p. 57).

3. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES
3.1 Security Policies Across Office Locations
Instilling a culture of security to an employee base across jurisdictions and across enterprises is extremely
difficult. Many remote office locations within multinational organizations deem themselves as having their
own special requirements and therefore enact their own set of security policies and procedures. Even if
policies look relatively similar between locations, their descriptions and how they are implemented may
differ significantly. Penalties, for instance, for breaches of the ethics policy may be dealt with differently in
two neighboring countries (SANS Institute, 2007a). More and more consulting companies are moving
towards forming service level agreements (SLAs) and contracts with their multinational clients (Purser, 2004,
p. 206). Added to this is ‘how’ things are done by people based on professional codes of conduct. Contrast
the idea of an organizational ethics policy with that of “professional ethics” and codes of conduct.

3.2 Risk Assessment and Proactive Approaches to Information Security
Managing threats and vulnerabilities through risk management practices is increasingly being seen as the
number one way to overcome business security challenges. Organizations conduct risk assessment and
measurement in a number of different ways- (i) using risk assessment software often based on checklists, (ii)
conducting risk analysis which at the simplest level identifies individual risks and then estimates the
probability of loss and the likelihood of the event occurring in a given period, (iii) using compliance metrics
which usually rely on automated audit software to check information system(s). Risk measurement is about
measuring immunity and resiliency. If the gaps can be plugged then the chances of a breach in information
security occurring is minimized (Kesar & Rogerson, 2001, p. 221). With each new breach new gaps are
plugged as they are fed back to the appropriate personnel and systems (Ghosh, 2004). However, it must be
stated, that a proactive approach to security management is required. Proactive approaches to security are
when security tools and techniques are used to circumvent attacks before they occur. See especially Bakry
(2003, p. 203) who describes going from the current state of security to a target state and emphasizes the
importance of following a sound security development process. Whitman and Mattord (2005, p. 23) support
this idea describing the Security Systems Development Life Cycle (SSDLC). In the past, organizations have
waited for incidences that have crippled their organization’s productivity before making decisions to institute
a widespread, and often expensive, reflexive security measure.

3.3 Benchmarking an Organization’s Security Portfolio
There are a number of ways to improve security- fundamentally it has to do with benchmarking oneself
against other organizations. Even the best security solution after all, can never be foolproof, it can only

minimize breaches. One of the issues is that companies never quite know how much to spend on security,
though it seems logical that the more they expend, the safer their enterprise will be. However, herein lies the
anomaly, overspending on security, and becoming too security conscious, may impinge on employee welfare
and productivity. How much security is too much security is a complex question even for consultants to
answer. Basic information and computer security tools include: malware software, passwords, public key
cryptography (asymmetric encryption), firewalls, intrusion detection systems, honeypots and audit software.
These counter the potential for breaches in security including: viruses and worms, spyware, masquerading,
denial of service attacks, spoofing, and phishing. Social engineering, however, is still a difficult attack to
defend against as one or more individuals dupe another. Still, several layers of protection mean, that even if
an attacker is able to attain some secret information that given subsequent measures, beyond logins and
passwords, the attacker will be prevented from achieving their overall aim.

3.4 ISO 17799 Certification and Standards Compliance
The International Standards Organization (ISO) has a number of standards that pertain to security, and some
organizations have indicated their ‘readiness’ to conduct electronic business by highlighting the fact that they
are ISO 17799 certified (Johnson and Goetz, 2007, p. 22). This standard is mainly about security
management and highlights that an organization has taken security seriously, at least at a basic level of
assurance. Some security experts look on standards as compliance rather than improved security capabilities
for their organization. Many organizations who achieve certification abandon the idea that security is a
continual act and not a one-off quality issue. Other professional organizations and institutions also offer
varying levels of certification and training. For instance see SANS Institute (2007b). GIAC has certified over
18,000 security professionals. The Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) is among the
most respected security-related certifications.

3.5 Models for Funding and Resourcing Security
Funding and resourcing is an issue, and how to organize and prioritize who gets funding to meet particular
types of security challenges is not straightforward. Are funds distributed only to the information technology
group responsible for security, to individual departments, to individual systems, for new-hires to be utilized
in security-related positions, to specific projects? CERT (2007b) state that “[n]eglecting security
requirements, or isolating them from other requirements, jeopardizes the success of any development project.
And because security is such a fundamental and pervasive consideration, it is difficult—and expensive—to
incorporate into a finished application.” Funding models are closely allied to system lifecycle approaches
espoused by an organization. Other considerations include whether security funding is distributed on an
annual or on a needs basis? Is security a core competency of the information technology group, and what are
the risks associated with getting an external company to conduct security management? As Bernstein (pp. 8892) predicted as far back as 1996, “budgetary constraints are likely to be the largest obstacle.”

4. THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SECURITY
4.1 Hiring Talent with the Right Attitude
It has been said on more than one occasion that people are at the centre of good security practice- talent with
the right attitude, expertise and business acumen (Stahl, 2002). Yet one criticism of security groups is that
while they are technically astute, they often lack an overall strategic vision. The best security management
initiatives can fail due to the staff’s inability to carry them out appropriately (Friedman and Kahn, 1997, p.
303). In addition, security-centric resources are usually spread thinly across a number of portfolios. While
Kesar and Rogerson (2001) state that “[o]rganizational problems such as lack of safeguards, together with
ineffective monitoring and lack of internal audits, leads to illicit acts,” they also emphasize that “personal
factors” pertaining to individual employees are as much to blame.

4.2 Employee and Executive Accountability for Security Practices
In global organizations, there is a well-known cultural divide that can often only be bridged by top-down
communications- from executives to subordinates. Post the dot.com crash a great number of executives found
themselves on the unemployment queue or worse still criminally charged. Accountability, moral
responsibility (Tavani, 2007, p. 95) and transparency are all issues that global organizations are grappling
with and it is unfortunate that a rotten core often means that there are large portions that are negatively
influenced by dubious practices. Typical questions asked include: who did this, who is in charge, what should
I do in this instance, why should I do X, why did person A do action Z (Edgar, 2003, ch. 10)? Note the
differences between responsibility and liability. Liability differs from responsibility in that it is a legal notion
that carries with it real consequences and is often bound by law not just policy. The opposite problem also
exists where control on employee practices is relaxed so much, that it is at the detriment of the security of the
overall business. To work effectively, senior management need to be vocal about supporting security, staff
need ongoing training, and an attitude that security is everyone’s problem is required.

4.3 Data Governance by Executives and Senior Management
Data governance has meant that executives and boards are now officially responsible for an organization’s
adherence to federal and state laws (Pfleeger, 2007, p. 13). Case law has shown since 1996, beginning with
the Caremark case (Trope, 2007, p. 32) that civil and criminal penalties apply for breaches in security. Today,
executives in positions of responsibility may not only be tried on account of a conscious decision that was
made in a given situation but in an “unconsidered inaction”.

4.4 Cyberinsurance and the Need to Minimize Liability
In a bid for some large companies to attain some level of assurance they have taken out cyberinsurance for
incidences like destruction of data and software, business interruption, data theft, denial of services and
extortion (Baer and Parkinson, 2007, p. 50). All the major cyberinsurance carriers offer network security
liability, content and electronic media injury, and breaches in privacy of confidentiality liability. Current
offerings even address the issue of cyberterrorism based on such government acts like the U.S. Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (Tavani, 2007, p. 179).

5. LAWS, REGULATIONS AND LIABILITIES
5.1 The Trusted Corporation
Organizations should not adhere to security standards for the sake of compliance; they should adhere because
it means that their business will remain sustainable. Tavani (2007, p. 213) however recognizes that in
“America, there are strict liability laws, but there are also disclaimers and caveats issued by manufacturers to
protect themselves against litigation.” The idea of a trusted corporation is important here- no one wants to do
business, especially consumers, with an organization that has been in the media due to financial losses as a
direct result of breaches in security. Consumers especially do not wish to be liable for security breaches, such
as personal data misuse. Enter the government, as an overseer of business practices with a mission to ensure
personal data protection (Europa, 2007).

5.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Regulations like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act help drive security in organizations but there is a sort of chicken and
egg problem here- is regulation driving security or security driving regulation? For instance, in section 404 of
the Act, information security is not explicitly addressed but there is a requirement for internal control over

financial reporting, which in turn implies sufficient data security controls and security practices. Compare
this Act with older legislative controls such as the 1990 Computer Misuse Act in the United Kingdom, and
the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and 1987 Computer Security Act in the United States (Kesar and
Rogerson, 2001, p. 223). It should also be noted here, that regulatory compliance requirements also imply
enormous follow-up costs in IT processes and security management.

5.3 The European Cybercrime Treaty
To try to overcome issues with computer-related legislation across jurisdictions, in 2001 an international law
enforcement treaty was drafted and signed by the United States, Canada, Japan and South Africa, led by the
Council of Europe (CoE). “The articles of the treaty regulate illegal access, data or system interference,
misuse of devices, computer-related forgery and fraud, child pornography, and copyright, among other
items.” The treaty was ratified in June, 2004 by thirty-eight countries. One of the major problems identified
at the CoE 2004 International Conference on Cybercrime was that the “laws, criminal justice systems and
levels of international cooperation have not kept pace with the lightening fast speed of technological
development, despite the concerted efforts by the United Nations and the CoE.” The problem with
cyberspace is that physical boundaries are blurred, so the concept of jurisdiction also becomes difficult to
enforce (Edgar, 2003, p. 190f). According to Tavani (2007, p. 213) “[n]ot only have there been problems in
prosecuting Internet crimes that span state borders, but criminal enforcement has been hampered as well by a
lack of international legal agreements and treaties.” See also Weismann (2006, p. 243), and Smith et al.,
(2004, ch. 4) for cross-border issues and dealing with cybercrime. A major problem with international treaties
is that countries are not bound to make changes to conflicts that might arise between the new international
treaty and existing domestic laws. This introduces a number of ambiguities depending on the case.

6. GOVERNMENT POWERS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
The powers of the government and respective law enforcement agencies have increased manifold since the
rise of modern day communication systems. For example, there is an increasing number of Internet
pedophilia cases which have seen chat-room predators convicted internationally. Among other crimes that
law enforcement agencies are dealing with include: identity theft, organized crime, money laundering,
cyberterrorism, fraud or embezzlement, theft of information or services, and industrial espionage (Brenner,
2007). While an organization attempts to make its private systems and networks more secure, legislation
post-September 11 is making it even easier for the government to obtain information in the form of
individual transaction records. Surveillance capabilities have not only increased because of advancements in
technologies such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) but are now fully supported by legislation as well.
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